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FOUNDERING ON THE SEAS OF 
HOPELESSNESS 
Mary C. Dunlap* 
GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW. By Rich-
ard D. Mohr. New York: Columbia University Press. 1988. Pp. ix, 
335. $30. 
I wanted badly to like this book. By itself, the scarcity of excellent, 
comprehensive scholarship on the subject of sexual orientation and the 
law made me cheer for Gays/ Justice to be a major hit. The particular 
absence of works that bring multidisciplinary perceptiveness to the 
problems confronting gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons gave me all 
the more cause to root for a victory here. As a public interest law 
practitioner and teacher who has become increasingly concerned with 
"gay rights" cases, 1 I am acutely aware that cases involving sexual 
minorities are about politics and psychology at least as much as they 
are about the content of law. That awareness caused me to be espe-
cially enthusiastic about a book so openly and generously entitled 
Gays/ Justice, whose jacket features a quotation by May Sarton, a bril-
liant and brave lesbian feminist novelist and poet, who promises that 
Mohr's work is not only "challenging and timely," but "heroic." 
Let us begin with the claim that Professor Mohr's book is "he-
roic." It is correct that, in his introduction, he identifies himself as a 
gay person, and dedicates the work to his "lover and husband," Rob-
ert Switzer (p. 17). To this extent, I agree that the book is heroic. It is 
hard to be openly gay and to hold a position as a professional or aca-
* B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, University of California at Berkeley. - Ed 
1. Since about 1980, I have been a solo practitioner of civil rights law. Before that time, I co-
founded Equal Rights Advocates, Inc., in San Francisco, California, a women's rights law firm 
that is about to celebrate its fifteenth anniversary as a public interest law organization. My 
career as a practitioner has afforded me several important opportunities to represent gay and 
lesbian persons and organizations seeking equal justice under the law. Among the best-known of 
my cases are: San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522 (1987) (upholding USOC's trademark-based claim of right to suppress use of "Gay Olympic 
Games" by no!lp~ofit corporation seeking to challenge homophobia, and rejecting constitutional 
claims on basis that U.S. Olympic Committee is not engaged in "state action"); Hill v. INS, 714 
F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (vindicating right of foreign national not to be excluded from U.S. 
based on homosexuality unless anq until mc;dical basis for exclusion is established); Beller v. 
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) (rejecting, inter a/ia, 
claims of bisexual/lesbian Navy member who contended that her absolute ineligibility for reen-
listment, based solely on homosexuality, violated her privacy and liberty rights). My other ca-
reer, as a teacher of civil rights law sjnce the early 1970s, currently includes teaching courses 
conce~ing sexual orientation and the law at Golden, Gate University (1984-1988) and Stanford 
University (1988-1989) law schools. 
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demic person in a nation whose highest court, at least by some read-
ings of Bowers v. Hardwick, 2 has branded each and all of us who are 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual as criminals. The Court in Hardwick, after 
all, called the claim to privacy for our adult, consensual, and noncom-
mercial sexual lives conducted in physical privacy, "facetious."3 
Moreover, people have lost their jobs for doing little or nothing more 
than what Professor Richard Mohr has done - identifying himself as 
gay in a context subject to publicity - and such terminations have 
been upheld in several courts.4 
Indeed, it is very hard to be openly gay in this nation, regardless of 
one's occupation and social status. A full litany of the wrongs accom-
panying gay identification in this legal and social system has been re-
cited elsewhere. 5 Consider simply the greater likelihood that those of 
us who are, as well as those who are believed to be, gay/lesbian may be 
spat upon, struck, harmed, and even killed simply because of the per-
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's criminal proscription of all anal-genital and 
oral-genital contacts as punishable "sodomy," as against challenge by gay man claiming that 
statute violated his federal constitutional right to privacy). 
3. 478 U.S. at 194. 
4. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert 
denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (overturning jury verdict of sexual orien,tation discrimination in 
favor of guidance counselor terminated from employment for "coming out" as "bisexual," de-
claring that she had failed to prove that heterosexuals would have been treated differently); 
Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491F.2d498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) (secondary 
schoolteacher fired for "coming out" as gay on a television program - in the company of his 
parents - lost appeal, where Court of Appeals held that he was not fired for being gay, but for 
misrepresentation, consisting of failing to recite on his initial teaching application that he had 
been a member of the Homophiles of Penn State); McConnell v. Anderson, 451F.2d193, 196 
(8th Cir. 1971),. cert denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972) (university librarian denied employment for 
being openly gay and denied application for marriage license with his male partner was held not 
to have been deprived of equal protection or other constitutional rights, because the Court of 
Appeals concluded that by his gay identifying statements he sought "to foist tacit approval of 
this socially repugnant concept [equal treatment for "homosexuals"] upon his employer ... an 
institution of higher learning"). But see, e.g., National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 
F.2d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 1984), affd. per curiam by an equally divided Court, 470 U.S. 903 
(1985) (upholding appellate decision invalidating provisions of Oklahoma statute that enabled 
terminations of employment of any persons found to be "advocating, soliciting, imposing, en-
couraging or promoting ... homosexual activity"); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 (5th 
Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982) (determining that termination of employment of gay 
pubiic servant for public speaking on homosexuality was unconstitutional deprivation of first 
amendment rights). · 
5. Such a litany - which would have to include criminalization of gay/lesbian sex; illegiti-
mation of gay/lesbian families; pathologization of gay/lesbian persons; mistreatment due to 
AIDS/ ARC; discrimination in both military and nonmilitary employment; silencing and trivial-. 
ization of gay/lesbian speech and association; rejection and harassment by family, church, and 
state; and active commercial and economic discrimination including that historically inflicted 
and recently intensified (based on AIDS/ ARC discrimination) by the insurance industry -
readily can be derived from the briefest perusal of any of several publications, including: LA VEN-
DER LA w SOURCEBOOK (National Conference on Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues, Golden Gate 
University Law School, Nov. 11-13, 1988); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (R. 
Achtenberg ed. 1985); Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual 
Persons In the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979). 
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mission afforded to homophobes in this society. 6 Bigoted violence is 
on the rise, and its victims plainly include those perceived, correctly or 
incorrectly, to be gay.7 In this era, the attribution of heroism to Rich-
ard Mohr for his writing from an openly gay vantage point seems 
somewhat appropriate. 
Further justification for the "heroic" appellation of Mohr's work 
derives, in my opinion, from his effort to follow the challenging ethics 
of admitting the life experiences that affected his viewpoints and moti-
vated him to write Gays/Justice. Writing as a gay person who vocally 
cherishes freedom and equal justice, who considers himself married to 
his lover, and who along with his lover has been the victim of anti-gay 
violence (p. 17), Mohr surely fulfills the moral mandate of contempo-
rary legal scholarship that a writer should "come out" about those 
aspects of his/her life that most prominently affect the writing itself. 8 
It was constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe who first wrote in 1978 
that "the morality of responsible scholarship points not at all to the 
classic formula of supposedly value-free detachment and allegedly un-
biased description. Instead such morality points to an avowal of the 
substantive beliefs and commitments that necessarily inform any ac-
count of constitutional arguments and conclusions."9 I take Professor 
Tribe's mandate a bit further than he perhaps intended, and believe 
6. The "individualized" violence caused by homophobia is perhaps one of its most atrocious 
forms, but hardly the only one. "Symbolic" violence against gay/lesbian people seems to be 
happening regularly, as Mohr's work appropriately stresses, especially where it emphasizes the 
jeopardy to our dignity that results from this systemic sociolegal assault upon us. See pp. 315·37. 
One of the most powerful sources of this rhetorical violence against us appears to be the United 
States government, at least during the Reagan era. Former President Reagan's declaration of 
AIDS Awareness Month at the end of the month when it was to take place (October 1988), for 
example, not to mention the Reagan administration's AIDS policies generally, signify 
homophobia in a vivid and highly destructive form. See Dunlap, AIDS and Discrimination in the 
United States: Reflections on the Nature of Prejudice in a Virus, 34 VILL. L. REV. (1989) 
(forthcoming). 
7. Pp. 27-29; see also Report Says Violent Crimes Against Gays are Increasing, Wash. Blade, 
Jan. 15, 1988, at 8, col. 1 (describing National Council of Churches report, which concluded that 
"violent crimes committed against Gays have increased because of growing national hysteria 
about the AIDS crisis [and] the rhetoric of anti-Gay activists •.• "); 134 CONG. REC. 523-26 
(daily ed. Jan. 25, 1988) (remarks of Sens. Cranston and Kerry in support of the Hate Crimes 
Statistics Act of 1988, which was passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee but did not reach the 
full Senate). Senator Paul Simon oflllinois, joined by 29 Senators, introduced a virtually identi· 
cal bill in the lOlst Congress. See 135 CONG. REc. Sl563 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989). 
8. I have made an effort, in this vein, to unify the personal and the political and to advance 
the cause of liberating legal scholarship from pretenses of neutrality, by means of a long footnote 
in an article on sexual speech in which I "come out" in some areas that help to explain my value 
judgments about pornography and related subjects. Dunlap, Sexual Speech and The State: Put-
ting Pornography in Its Place, 11 GOLDEN GATE u. L. REV. 359, 363 n.10 (1987). 
9. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW iv (1978). Professor Tribe was lead counsel 
for Michael Hardwick in Bowers v. Hardwick. In his petition for rehearing in Hardwick. Profes-
sor Tribe wrote what I consider to be the most memorable and powerful one-sentence statement 
of Hardwick's argument: "[T]he question before the Court is not what Respondent Michael 
Hardwick was doing in the privacy of his own bedroom, but what the State of Georgia was doing 
there." Petition for Rehg. at 10, Hardwick. July 24, 1986. 
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that little scholarship (legal or otherwise) in which the scholar's beliefs 
and experiences are hidden from view by vocabularies and customs of 
depersonalization is' of lasting usefulness or value. To the extent that 
such beliefs and expertise are sublimated they are likely to muddle the 
contents and conclusions of the work-. From this perspective, what is 
most heroic about Mohr's openness in identifying his work as stem-
ming from his own experience as a gay person is his willingness to take 
the risk that some in the academic and professional circles reading 
Gays/ Justice will rush to condemn Mohr's work as merely personal or 
severely biased. Unlike those who continue to play academic hide-
and-seek behind walls of "neutral principles" and third-person decla-
rations, Richard Mohr is bravely "out" in Gays/ Justice. 
Unfortunately, the heroism of Mohr's openness about his exper-
iences ends there, in the introduction of his book. Mohr has confused 
the power of personal honesty as a matter of academic ethics with the 
force of idiosyncracy and quirkiness. While the first has the capacity 
to change our lives, the second can prove alienating, if not downright 
distracting, to a reading public. Mohr's frequent assertions of his ex-
perience degenerate into moral mandates and political prescriptions; 
where the candor ends, sadly, the egoism begins, continuing un-
tempered by human dialogues that might have given this book depth 
and strength beyond one person's unchallenged ideas. 
The book itself is full of poorly justified value judgments, cloaked 
in assertions oflogical rectitude and philosophical purity. Underneath 
is an outraged and lonely Richard Mohr, ranting in stubborn and 
sometimes arrogant "isolation" (p. 16) against the entire world that he 
set out to reason with and perhaps to change. While I empathize with 
the gay person Richard Mohr, many of whose feelings of rage, disgust, 
and loneliness I share as they pulsate throughout the book, I am disap-
pointed and irritated by the writer Richard Mohr who has allowed 
himself to become so victimized by and so lost in his subject. And I 
am utterly unpersuaded by the scholar Richard Mohr, whose categori-
cal pronouncements about controversial subjects are not so much "he-
roic" as pompous, grandiose, and, academically speaking, reckless. 
The honesty of Mohr's introduction and experiential illustrations 
do not come close to healing the gaping flaws in Gays/ Justice. My 
desire to celebrate this book as a work long overdue in an area in dire 
need of philosophical scrutiny has been flattened, in the end, by the 
book itself. 
The book's cynical, pessimistic tone is exacerbated by Mohr's fail-
ure to stay current with the progress of the gay /lesbian rights move-
ment. Refusing to recognize what gains have been made, Mohr dwells 
on and even overstates setbacks in order to maintain his dingy per-
spective on future possibilities. 
Mohr declares that "the stereotype of gays as sick continues apace 
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in the mind of America" (p. 23). Although here, as in countless other 
places in Gays/ Justice, Mohr fails to provide so much as a footnote to 
support his generalization, apparent support for this particular gener-
alization could be divined from the recent publication of studies on 
AIDS indicating that "[a] substantial minority of Americans see 
AIDS as a deserved punishment for offensive or immoral behavior and 
show signs of intolerance and outright hostility to those with the dis-
ease." 10 This generalization and many others in Mohr's work paint 
the entire population of the United States as bigots; nowhere are such 
statements softened by any indication that the gay and lesbian rights 
movement has achieved the slightest degree of success in diminishing 
the image of gay people as diseased. Asserting that science cannot do 
much to alter stereotypes, Mohr ignores the potent force both of the 
American Psychiatric Association's 1974 determination that homosex-
uality is neither a mental disorder nor a condition of sexual abnormal-
ity, 11 and of activists' efforts to educate Americans about AIDS and 
the gay and lesbian community. 12 Set on convincing the reader of the 
devastation of anti-gay bigotry, Mohr effaces all efforts that have come 
before and alongside him to reduce, resist, and overcome that bigotry. 
What a mistake such narrow and pessimistic accounting of this part of 
the civil rights movement is; to read Mohr's account, one would read-
ily conclude that the last twenty years of work in the movement for 
gay and lesbian rights have been nothing but a gigantic waste. 
Stylistically, the work suffers from a similar arrogance. Mohr's 
metaphors and analogies often seem glib and sloppy. For example, he 
compares anti-gay discrimination, and queerbashing in particular, to 
rape and to lynching (pp. 27-28). This is a powerful comparison, and 
might have proved to be an effective one had Mohr paid even the 
10. Blendon & Donelan, Discrimination Against People with AIDS, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1022, 1023 (1988). 
11. Anyone who seriously doubts the force of that move by the AP A should read the deci-
sions of both the Surgeon General of the United States and of Robert P. Aguilar, U.S. District 
Judge for the Northern District of California, whose determinations that gay and lesbian people 
must not summarily be excluded from immigration to the U.S. are based in significant part on 
the medical evidence that homosexuality is not a mental disorder and on a memorandum by 
Surgeon General Julius B. Richmond to the Public Health Service. See Lesbian/Gay Freedom 
Day Comm. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, ajfd. in relevant part sub nom. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 
(9th Cir. 1983). 
12. It is hard to believe, for example, that Mohr can write of the AIDS crisis and not take 
any significant note of the Names Project's AIDS Memorial Quilt, a nationwide grassroots pro-
ject of more than 15,000 patchwork pieces bringing together art, craft, political statements, and 
personal mementos of people who have lost their lives to AIDS. A recent letter to The Washing-
ton Blade states: 
The Quilt is a melting pot. It brings together Gay and straight, young and old, parent and 
child, weak and strong. 
But most of all, the Quilt is a call to arms. . . . Never before being an activist in Gay 
issues, I am now confronted with the challenge of doing something for others, and for 
myself. 
Letter to the Editor, Wash. Blade, Oct. 21, 1988, at 35. 
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slightest attention to the volume of literature on the subjects to which 
he is- comparing anti-gay violence. Instead, Mohr plays the misan-
thrope throughout the work, casting aside the parallel experiences of 
lesbians, black persons, and women, with harsh and conclusory pro-
nouncements about the differences of their experiences from his gay 
male focus. For example, Mohr asserts in his introduction that 
[o]ne of the most remarkable features of the black civil rights movement 
... was that its legal successes were achieved without anything remotely 
resembling an articulated, ramified pattern of reason and argument, let 
alone a political theory .... [T]heory and argument were not needed. 
There was no articulated, substantive, argumentative opposition to that 
movement, and religious sentiment and appeal filled in where words 
failed or were lacking altogether. [p. 2] 
This statement almost knocked the wind out of me. 13 Could this obvi-
ously well-read and highly educated man possibly be so ignorant of the 
history of the legal aspects of black civil rights development that he is 
unaware of the decades that black scholars, writers, and teachers spent 
assembling the theory of equal justice - the theory that eventually 
gained persuasive power through the efforts of then-advocate 
Thurgood Marshall and others in Brown v. Board of Education 14 and 
other cases?15 Not even gay men escape Mohr's predilection for ste-
reotypes; at one point he declares that "safe-sex is poor sex" and that 
"[s]ex is the core of gay male culture" (p. 232). As insulted as I am 
that Mohr is so chauvinistic toward lesbians, 16 I suspect I would be 
even more insulted if I were a gay man on the target end of such ag-
gressively homophobic generalities as "[g]ay male culture is largely a 
system of highly efficient sexual delivery systems" (p. 232); "gay turf 
consists of sex arcades" (p. 233); and, "[s]elf-respect, such as it is, for 
gays in our culture is the product of a robust sex life" (p. 233). 
Richard Mohr's view of gay culture is the view of a person isolated 
from change and refusing to believe that it happens. Believing that 
most people are not up to reforming the system (p. 27) and shielded by 
the repeated use of "they" while talking of a group of which he is 
13. Mohr clings to this position to the bitter end of his book, when he asserts that blacks had 
no "ramified, articulate system of political principles" in securing the gains of the civil rights 
movement to date. P. 329. 
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (JJ.rown II). 
15. One of the best and most detailed accounts of what actually was the development of an 
"articulated, ramified pattern of reason and argument" by scholars, attorneys, and others sup-
porting the rights of black Americans is contained in R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); see 
also J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL R!GtqS YEARS, 1954-1965 (1987); 
Eyes on the Prize (PBS television series, 1987). 
16. Richard Mohr's praise of me as "refreshingly brash" and "emanating dykeness like a 
supernova throwing off neutrinos," p. 323, does not alter my sense that his treatment of lesbians 
generally in Gays/ Justice is chauvinistic. The numerous battles fought by and in behalf oflesbian 
and bisexual women are generally overlooked by Mohr, who keeps busy attributing us with sepa-
ratist views, p. 15, or taking potshots at feminism ("Shallow feminism, paired with legal formal-
ism, is for gays a loaded gun left unattended." P. 327). 
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himself a declared member, Mohr seems to have missed all or virtually 
all of the triumphal moments shared by gays and lesbians in the past 
two decades. Nowhere in this very long book is there a description of 
the thousands of proud and open gay and lesbian and pro-gay people 
striding into a San Francisco stadium for the "Gay Olympics" of 1982 
and 1986; instead, Mohr invokes the defeat in the "Gay Olympics" 
case as another example of the hopelessness of the cause in our courts 
- after labeling the case as "completely trivial" and "wholly sym-
bolic" (p. 316). Nowhere does Mohr so much as mention the activism 
of families of gay persons, despite the longevity and visibility of groups 
such as PFLAG (Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays) nor does 
he give any credence to parents such as Robert Bernstein, who 
proudly spoke of his lesbian daughter in The New York Times: 
My daughter ... is the light of my life. . . . It is estimated that there are 
upward of 25 million gay people, who by definition started out with 
some 50 million parents. Sooner or later, a large portion of those parents 
will want to enlist in the crusade for their children's dignity.I' 
Nowhere does he describe the October 1987 March on Washington 
in which 500,000 people participated in a protest for gay and lesbian 
rights. Mohr treats that watershed event with the same cavalier si-
lence as did the straight media he repeatedly criticizes. Ignoring all 
these hopeful signs, Mohr opines that "[t]or gay politics, one chief 
consequence of the centrality of the coming out experience to gay 
existence is that nongay acquaintances, other dispossessed groups, 
friends, and even - or especially - blood families are not going to be 
very much help to the gay movement" (p. 327). 
Mohr's commitment to presenting the dismal side of the panorama 
of Gays/ Justice causes him not only to disguise or omit our successes, 
but to overstate our losses. Even though he is expressly aware of the 
panel decision in Watkins v. United States Army, 18 Mohr erroneously 
asserts that "[e]very federal circuit court that has been faced with a 
claim of gay equal protection has summarily rejected it" (p. 318); the 
fact that the equal protection claim in Watkins was sustained is rele-
gated to a footnote (p. 318 n.8). So intent is he on his conclusion that 
"[t]he courts have simply not been up to the task of justice when it 
comes to gays" (p. 319) that he fails to cite or discuss most cases 
where courts have sustained gays' claims of constitutional 
infringements.19 
The unsupported conclusions that riddle and ultimately ruin Gays/ 
Justice stem from the declared anger of a person who claims that gay 
17. Bernstein, My Daughter ls a Lesbian, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1988, at A27, col. 1. 
18. 837 F.2d 1428, rehg. granted en bane, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988); see infra note 25. 
19. See, e.g., Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that gay public 
servant was unconstitutionally deprived of first amendment rights when he was fired for speaking 
publicly on the subject of homosexuality). 
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people are by themselves (I would say "ourselves" at this point, had 
Mohr not intentionally written lesbians out of his work from the intro-
duction onward) in having to reason and argue for rights and for jus-
tice. In this regard, Mohr is tragically mistaken. Black people and 
other people of color have had to reason and argue for every inch of 
progress they have made in this legal system, and have repeatedly ex-
perienced irrational, arbitrary responses to their best-reasoned posi-
tions. The process of rational argument to preserve and improve civil 
rights gains for people of color continues.20 While it may be heroic to 
wear the pink triangle in an environment and an era in which it is a 
badge of inferiority and an invitation to an attack, ultimately it is only 
foolish and self-destructive to assume that one's experiences of oppres-
sion and discrimination are completely unlike those of other minori-
ties, or that the system one proposes to address is incapable of 
correcting those injustices. 
I grant that it is difficult not to despair of such extreme problems 
when bigotry is so terrible and so hurtful. But I believe it is a great 
mistake not to recognize improvements, even little ones. Such sweep-
ing condemnations of society and its institutions make it all the more 
difficult for those of us who are actively engaged in working for change 
from within to hold on to our justified and vital sense of progress. 
When Mohr declares that "police and juries simply discount testi-
mony of gays" (p. 28) without acknowledging the progress that has 
been made in overcoming the prejudices of at least some who work in 
law enforcement and litigation, I feel irritated. Mohr ignores that 
"police and juries" include gay people.21 Moreover, Mohr seems to 
have missed a key forensic rule: Be sure to state the exceptions, lest 
others rebut you by dwelling upon them. 
Mohr gets similarly carried away with his analyses of political and 
legal history. He mischaracterizes a verdict of not guilty due to 
mental illness as "innocent due to mental illness"22 when seeking to 
show how people who harm gays get away with it, and misstates the 
meaning of equal protection (pp. 90-91 n.102). He cites a thirteen-
year-old book to support overstatements regarding the problem of em-
ployment discrimination against gay people, when the law has devel-
oped considerably since (p. 30). He skips over the fact that the late 
Dan White murdered not only gay leader and San Francisco Supervi-
sor Harvey Milk but progressive Mayor George Moscone as well (p. 
29). Here, as at numerous other junctures where Mohr could have 
taken notice of the victimization of nongay people, he chooses instead 
20. In 1988, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court proposed to review the long-standing ap-
plicability of§ 1981 to private racial discrimination. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, No. 87-
107 (U.S. argued, Oct. 12, 1988). 
21. In California, there is a formal organization of gay and lesbian law enforcement officers 
nicknamed "Pigs In Paradise." 
22. P. 29 (emphasis added). 
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to ignore the obvious linkage between support for gay rights and a 
broader human rights movement. The larger phenomenon of violent 
attack upon representatives of progressive political activism repre-
sented by the twin assassinations of Milk and Moscone suggests pos-
sibilities of such a coalition. 
Unfortunately, the word "coalition" is anathema to Richard 
Mohr. He insists that coalitions built to advance gay rights are inef-
fective and unnecessary, and that the struggles of other oppressed peo-
ple are "not gays' fights" (p. 329). In what seems a desperate final 
effort to win this argument, he labels coalition politics a "communist 
fantasy" (p. 329). While Richard Mohr was busy writing this chapter 
decrying coalitions, gay and lesbian people worked with one of the 
broadest-based coalitions of the decade to defeat the Supreme Court 
nomination of Robert Bork, whose notoriety a!! anti-gay was at least as 
complete as his fame for being an opponent of civil rights for people of 
color and women.23 Mohr's argument that gays are different from 
these other groups because "what gays want is simply what everyone 
else already has - rights and privileges - the acquisition of which 
does not diminish those of others" (p; 329) is myopic; once again, 
Mohr needlessly isolates himself. Mohr ought to acknowledge that 
the cry of the oppressed for freedom is heard as a threat by those 
whose freedom depends on that oppression. Whether he likes it or 
not, this fact gives real force to coalitions of oppressed people. 
All too often in this book, Mohr pretends that other victims of 
discrimination, such as blacks and women, are better off than gay 
men. In doing so, Mohr forgets the continuing inequities of our legal 
and social system, while blunting the important reality that some gay 
men are also members of other oppressed groups. In his claim that 
this nation is done with anti-Semitism and anti-Catholicism, and that 
abortion and incest are no longer considered unnatural (p. 34), Mohr 
isolates himself and gay men from the rest of the world. Yet in a 
world where he is the only victim, who will listen to Mohr's cries? His 
failure to examine carefully the emotional content of his statements 
sets him so far apart from his audience that his conclusions lack credi-
bility. Mohr is so set on having it worse than anyone else that he 
23. The national coalition against the nomination of Robert Bork included many lesbian and 
gay leaders; I was a co-chair of the Northern California Coalition Against Bork in San Francisco, 
along with T.J. Anthony, a gay male political activist. We of the NCCAB closely and coopera· 
tively with a wide and diverse array of civil rights community leaders, including Eva Jefferson-
Paterson of the Lawyers Committee for Urban Affairs, a black female attorney; Abby Ginzberg, 
President of the local chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, a Jewish female attorney; and Ed 
Chen, of ACLU Northern California, an Asian male attorney. These coalitions grew from the 
recognition of mutual interest in preventing the appointment of a man who had been a vocal, 
vituperative enemy of every known group seeking its civil rights, from people of color to women 
to gay and lesbian people and poor people. If it had not been for this "communist fantasy," as 
Richard Mohr terms such coalitions, there can be little doubt that Bork's nomination would have 
been confirmed. 
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misses opportunities to connect with,people and events that might give 
him hope. 
In blaming bigotry's triumphs, in part, on the mindlessness of tele-
vision and radio (p. 3), Mohr not only refuses to see the positive poten-
tial of the media in the struggle against heterosexism and homophobia, 
but ignores the centuries of mindless bigotry preceding these relatively 
modem inventions. It is this kind of narrow, categorical prescription 
about what is wrong and what causes anti-gay prejudice that is most 
disappointing in Gays/ Justice. 
It comes back to this: Richard Mohr is writing from an anti-colle-
gial, isolationist perspective, refusing to recognize the diverse array of 
allies whose ideas and feelings might mitigate the severity and misan-
thropy of his own. Decrying the superficiality of others, Mohr barely 
skims the surface in his purported description of a world rife with bias 
against gay people. Disturbingly, Mohr himself accepts a definition of 
gay people based solely on sexuality (p. 22; pp. 232-34), when that 
same definition is at the heart of at least some bigotry toward gay peo-
ple. 24 If Mohr had claimed to be uttering an unmodulated scream, at 
le!lst that would have been intellectually as well as emotionally ho:µest. 
Instead, he undermines his own reasoning at every tum by pretending 
to be utterly rational about things that are clearly (and justifiably) 
driving hilll mad. Raging against this homophobic world in which we 
24. In Watkins v. United States Anny, 837 F.2d 1428, rehg. granted en bane, 847 F.2d 1362 
(9th Cir. 1988), Judges Norris and Canby distinguished the issue of a person's sexual orientation 
(status) from his/her sexual acts (conduct). The U.S. Anny's policies assumed, as did Judge 
Reinhardt in dissent from the majority's rejection of the military's ban on homosexuals, that we 
are definable by our sex acts. "Sodomy is an act basic to homosexuality," asserted Judge Rein-
hardt, who went on to assert that anal and oral sex are the main forms of sexual activity of 
homosexuals. 837 F.2d at 1455 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing a single 1978 treatise). As a 
person who defines herself as a lesbian, I deeply resent the idea that it is my sexual activity per se 
that renders me one; if I never had sexual contact with another female (and did with males, for 
that matter), I am quite certain that I would still be a lesbian. My lesbianism has more to do 
with my perspective than it does with the gender of those with whom I engage in intimate physi-
cal contact. See Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631 (1980). I 
am a "dyke" because that is the name men have given women who choose not to conform to the 
will of men. This is not a sexual act in the sense that either Judge Reinhardt or Richard Mohr 
means; by many definitions, it is simply freedom of speech. I am the "lesbian" of Sapphic poetry, 
whether or not I am fortunate enough to act out one of the poems. So when Richard Mohr 
declares that gay people do not choose to, but "simply find themselves having homosexual en-
counters" (p. 40), he does not describe my personal experience of struggle toward a lesbian con-
sciousness. My sexual orientation is, to this degree, chosen; it goes much deeper than my sexual 
longings or experiences, to an essential part of myself which is woman-centered and woman-
oriented in a way that I elect to call and permit others to call "lesbian" or "dyke." Perhaps it is 
this sort of independent self-definition that causes Richard Mohr to omit lesbians entirely from 
his definition of gay peop~e, which he bases wholly and explicitly on Kinsey's "homosexual" 
headcounting. Pp. 21-22. Mohr's proviso, that he has determined to speak more about gay men 
than lesbians because he knows more about gay men, and that he has not attempted to address 
feminist lesbian issues where they differ from gay men's (pp. 15-16), is utterly irresponsible, as a 
philosophical and political matter. When Mohr defines "gay" to include only men, he reinforces 
the sexist treatment of lesbians within this society, and within the gay rights movement, as lesser 
if not invisible. Mohr's claim to speak less of lesbians because he knows less about us may be 
true, but proclaiming his ignorance does not excuse it. 
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find ourselves, Mohr's own biases so cloud his vision that it is hard to 
understand what he is seeing, past the rage itself. Mohr flagellates 
emotion even as he writes from it: as lawyers and philosophers alike 
have done for centuries.25 In the end, his thoughts and his emotions 
left me unpersuaded. 
Mohr repeatedly insists that people who are not gay cannot under-
stand. If that is true, what is the point of his 357-page book? At the 
same time that he cries out for recognition of the need for gay dignity, 
he denies his audience its ability to respect his position. More pain-
fully than most things I have read, Gays/ Justice reminds me of a les-
son I have learned over and over in my involvement with the human 
rights movement: s/he who would root out bigotry must, as a practi-
cal and ethical matter, start, continue, and never finish with her/ 
himself.26 
25. Plato's Republic, for example, is loaded with passages about the inferiority of women that 
were no more rational in ancient Greece than they are today, yet The Republic is esteemed as a 
model of classical reasoning. 
26. This year I will celebrate four years of sobriety and recovery from codependence, and one 
year as a member of the AI-Anon 12-Step Program. Every week we recite the AA Prayer: 
"[God/goddess] grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to 
change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference." If Richard Mohr is serious in 
his view that the legal system and the social system are irremediably set upon destroying us, and 
ifhe is equally certain of the faithlessness and ignorance of the rest of us gay people (pp. 1-2, 328-
37), then he must focus on himself as the only "thing" he can "change." Both my personal and 
my professional experience tell me that that change in focus may prove more valuable to Mohr's 
theoretical quest than all his remonstrations about what others have failed to see, do, or believe. 
